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certificates that the statements accurately represent the 
evidence of the witness/expert.
  It should be a rule of court that no expert or other 
witness is permitted to be paid on a speculative, 
contingent or conditional fee basis. A code of guidance 
will not suffice.
  Any undertaking which impairs the ability of members 
of the public to gain access to a particular solicitor or 
solicitors should be submitted to the court for the 
court's approval at the cost of the party seeking the
undertaking. Rules of court governing such applicationso o o r r
should emphasise the potential detrimental effect on 
access to justice and the court's obligations under 
Article 6 of the ECHR.
  The Law Society's Practice Rules should make clear that 
a solicitor's duty to their client under Practice Rule 1 
puts the solicitor in a situation of conflict with their 
client if the solicitor is aware that insurance they advise 
the client to take out is either unnecessary or 
unnecessarily expensive.
  There should be written into the Bar's Code of Conduct 
stronger provisions requiring barristers always to act in 
accordance with their client's interest, and not the 
personal interests ol the barristers. These provisions 
should be carefully drafted so that they can be used as 
the basis for charges of professional misconduct if 
evidence that they have not been complied with is 
forthcoming.
o
  Intra-chambers conflict problems should be covered by 
specific provisions in the Bar's Code of Conduct, and 
not be left merely to die Ediical Guidance provided by 
the Bar Council.
  Judges should play their appropriate part in maintaining 
and raising ethical standards in the legal professions. O
The working party members were: Geoffrey 
Bindman, senior partner, Bindman & Partners; 
Ben Emmerson QC; Max Findlay, legal writer & 
journalist; Matthias Kilian, Senior Research 
Fellow, Institute of Employment & Business Law, 
Cologne; Jennifer Levin, Foundation professor of 
Law, University of Wales; The Hon Mr Justice 
Lightman; David Mackie QC; Bill Montague, 
partner, Dexter Montague & Partners; Richard 
Moorhead, Senior Research Fellow, IALS; 
Richard O'Dair, senior lecturer in law, University 
College, London; Andrew Phillips, partner, Bates 
Wells & Braithwaite; Professor Avrom Sherr, 
Woolf Professor of Legal Education, IALS; Dr 
Hilary Sommerlad, solicitor, senior lecturer in 
law, Leeds Metropolitan University; Richard 
Southwell QC; Stella Yarrow, Research Fellow, 
School of Law, University of Westminster.
Copies of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies Report 
on The Ethics of Conditional Fees can be obtained, 
price £30 (£20 for SALS members) from Tracy Paradise, 
Secretary of SALS, on 020 7862 5866.
Midnight in the garden of 
the CFA people
by Richard Moorhead and Avrom Sherr
There is a lot riding on the success of conditional fee agreements (CFAs). They are a central plank in the government's legal services policy and, for many in 
the profession they offer the opportunity to reclaim 
practices damaged by the erosion and removal of legal aid. 
The Law Society has endorsed a conditional fee agreement 
referral scheme backed by insurance and there are 
numerous insurance companies selling conditional fee 
agreement related policies. More fundamentally, 
conditional fee agreements currently represent the best 
hope for the general public of gaining access to justice. 
Little surprise then that a report, produced by a working 
group of the Society of Advanced Legal Studies (SALS), 
The Ethics of Conditional Fee Arrangements, should provoke a
strong reaction from conditional fee agreement lawyers 
(see 'Conditional Fee Agreements', New Law Journal, 9 
February 2001).
All fee arrangements can lead to conflicts of interest,O '
and these problems must be kept in mind in assessing the 
pros and cons of conditional fee agreements. Similarly, the 
working party was well aware of the changes introduced 
by the Access to Justice Act f999; changes fully described in 
Chapter 2 of the report, which seek to reduce the 
exposure of clients to costs risks inherent in CFAs. It is 
understandable that government and some practitioners, 
with so much invested in the success of the scheme, would 
claim that the Access to Justice Act f 999 provides an answer 
to all of the problems raised by conditional fee 29
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agreements. Unfortunately, whilst conditional fee 
agreements should open up access to justice for some 
clients, it is clear that conditional fee agreements raise 
ethical and consumer protection issues, quite apart from 
the sustainability, desirability and cost of having a justice 
system in symbiotic union with the insurance industry.
A principal problem with conditional fee agreements is 
the mismatch of the rhetoric of 'no win no fee' and the 
claim that, 'the public love CFAs because they take the risk 
away from the public and put it on solicitors, where it 
belongs'. The truth is that these agreements are 
enormously complex, and at times loaded against the 
interests of the clients. Research indicates how difficult 
these complexities are for clients (see S Yarrow and P 
Abrams, 'Nothing to lose: clients' experience of using 
conditional fees'). Indeed for clients, Giles Smith's 
description of real tennis may be apt, particularly when 
things go wrong: 'imagine a squash match set in an 
abattoir with rules drawn up by Anthony Burgess' and you 
might not go far wrong (see G Smith, 'Midnight in the 
Garden of Evel KnieveP).
The 'no win no fee' rhetoric, and the claim that all die 
risk falls on the lawyer, can be judged initially by looking at 
the definition of 'win'. The Law Society's standard 
conditional fee agreement defines a 'win' as: 'Your claim 
for damages is finally decided in your favour, whether by a 
court decision or an agreement to pay you damages'. Win 
does not mean the payment of damages. So clients need to 
understand that if damages are not recovered, they have 
still 'won' and a fee is payable. As a result, clients, not 
lawyers, bear the risk of non-recovery of a damages 
agreement/award. It would be a simple matter to make the 
definition of 'wins' accord with what clients think it means 
and conditional fee agreements would become less 
complex. For that reason, the report recommended that 
for conditional fee agreements aimed wholly or mainly at 
recovering damages for the client, 'success' should be 
defined in terms of damages recovered rather than damages 
awarded, with provisions for solicitors to derogate from this 
approach where they can demonstrate fully-informed 
consent from the client (to assume the risk of non- 
recovery).
There are other areas where the simple appeal of 'no win 
no fee' masks its complexities from clients. Where a client 
wants to pull out of a conditional fee agreement case they 
do not 'win', yet they are liable for a fee. Similarly, the 
notion of 'fee' is confined only to the claimant lawyer's 
profit costs, a distinction which needs to be made absolutely 
clear to clients who will not immediately understand what it 
means when they are told they can be asked to pay for 
disbursements and unrecovered insurance premiums. The 
working party did not think that lawyers should be 
prevented from charging clients in these circumstances, but 
suggested that this be dealt with by giving clients a short 
'cooling-off period' to think about the implications of the
conditional fee agreement (particularly as pulling out of a 
conditional fee agreement is likely to be difficult) and the 
production of a video to explain the intricacies of 
conditional fee agreements in a palatable form.
A final area, which needs some examination, is the role 
of cost caps in conditional fee agreements. One of the 
myths surrounding the Access to Justice Act is that it nowJ o J
protects clients from paying their own lawyers for success 
fees, which are not recoverable from the opposition. This 
is not true. Success fees are split into two parts: the part 
based on risk (which should only be recoverable from the 
opposition) and the part based on the cost of borrowing. 
Lawyers can only recover this bit of the success fee from 
clients (and from their damages). Early indications are that 
the most scrupulous lawyers will either not claim any cost 
of borrowing uplift or will only claim a minor sum. About 
others, or less profitable firms, we can be less sure. 
Defendant lawyers (and their insurer clients) are itching to 
reduce the amounts that claimant lawyers receive under 
conditional fee agreement success fees. If they succeed, 
even in part, there is a real concern that some lawyers will 
cover themselves by claiming increasing amounts underJ o o
the cost-of-borrowing element of a success fee. This type 
of success fee is not only applicable in 'very limited 
circumstances'; it is possible in every single conditional fee 
agreement case. This is one of the areas where there is
o
almost no protection for the client, and is one reason why 
the working party recommended a cap on the total costs 
recovered from the client's damages. Similarly, the report 
addresses the question of a cap on costs breaching the 
indemnity principle: the report's proposals on a cap are 
contingent on abolition of the indemnity principle.
Proponents of conditional fee agreements have a good 
case on the need for conditional fee agreements (or 
something like them) to protect access to justice in the 
absence of legal aid, but conditional fee agreements and 
the Access to Justice Act have not yet struck a deal which is 
genuinely in the interests of the consumer or which will 
promote the good repute of die profession. It will be a 
shame if the loopholes and snags in the conditional fee 
agreement scheme begin to loom larger in the public 
consciousness when more members of the general public 
are caught out. These problems need to be dealt with 
quickly to prevent lawyers, conditional fee agreements, 
and the justice system, being tinged with disrepute.
This article was first published in the 23 February issue 
of the New Law Journal. ® 
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